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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ANGELO RA V ARINO, \ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) 
vs. \ 
HARRY PRICE, JR., and MRS. HARRY ( 
PRICE JR., his wife, and MRS. MAR- ) 
CUS PARR, also known as ARLIN-
DA PRICE PARR, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Civil No. 7882 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
· INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The basic problem in this case is a question of law, viz: 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case is the defendant 
Harry Price estopped in equity to assert the defense of the 
statute of frauds? 
The defendants Mrs. Harry Price and Mrs. Marcus Parr 
both signed an earnest money receipt for the sale of certain 
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............. 
property in Salt Lake City to plaintiff. Defendant Harry Price 
having signed a listing contract, then orally agreed to com-
plete the said written contract so signed by his wife and sister, 
Defendant Harry Price was told by plaintiff that he wanted 
to buy trackage for access to said property, but would buy only 
if Price definitely was going to sell to plaintiff, and on Price's 
assurance that he would sell, that there was a deal, and for 
plaintiff to buy the trackage, plaintiff, in reliance thereon 
bought a strip of land 19 x 60 feet adjoining the land in 
question for the sum of $1796.00. The real problem is whether 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable as against the 
statute of frauds in the defense of Harry Price. 
The defendants and appellants have not directly con-
tested any single finding of fact or conclusion of law of the 
Trial Court, nor have they asserted that any finding of fact 
is not amply supported by the record in the case. Instead, 
appellants have recited in considerable detail portions of the 
testimony and evidence in the action. They recite the facts 
as they would have liked the Trial Court to find them rather 
than as they were found by the Trial Judge. They request that 
the Court consider all of the evidence de novo. 
We agree that this Coutt will re-examine the evidence 
in cases of equity. However, where there is a conflict in the 
testimony and the findings of fact are amply supported by the 
evidence, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that this Court 
will not upset those findings. In the case at bar the Findings 
of Fact are not only supported by the evidence, but the Trial 
Court reasonably could not have made any other findings. For 
this reason the statement of facts of defendants and appellants 
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cannot be accepted. Reference will be made in the Statement 
of Facts to the issues of fact before the Court below and the 
findings made upon them by that Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 10, 1952, defendant Harry Price signed 
an exclusive sales agency contract authorizing one Lewis Han-
sen, a real estate broker in Salt Lake Gty, to list for sale the 
property located at "225-235 West 5th South," the size of 
the property being indicated as "165 x 165" (Exhibit D; R. 
76). Approximately two weeks after the signing of this 
agreement, Mr. Hansen told Mr. Price that he had a signed offer 
for $18,000.00 for the property (R. 77). Mr. Price told Mr. 
Hansen that he would come in after work and sign the earnest 
money receipt on which the offer appeared, but he failed to 
come. The next day he told Mr. Hansen that his wife "wouldn't 
sign" and Hansen would "have to get hold of her, she really 
runs that end of it" (R~ 77). Price told Hansen that "as long 
as she signed he would be willing to go along" (R. 82) . 
It appears that during July and August the Prices were 
shown several pieces of income property in Salt Lake City by 
Mr. Hansen. Their attention centered on a piece of property 
owned by Mr. A. C. Mollerup in Salt Lake City. Arrange-
ments were made for their inspection of the Mollerup property 
and a series of negotiations ensued between Mr. Rich, a real 
estate broker who was acting for the Mollerups, and Mr. 
Hansen, acting for the defendants, relating to the possibility 
of an arrangement whereby defendants would purchase the 
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Mollerup property with the money obtained from the sale 
of their property. The Prices had an appraisal made of the 
Mollerup property by a Mr. Schluter. In response to a tele-
phone call. from Mrs. Price, Hansen went to her office and 
discussed the transaction (R. 80). 
Exhibits E and J were discussed and signed at the same 
time by Mrs. Price at a coffee shop below Mrs. Price's office. 
"Exhibit E," the agreement sued upon in this cause, is an 
earnest money receipt dated September 21, 1950, signed by 
Mrs. Harry Price arrd Mrs. Marcus Parr, as sellers, and Angelo 
Ravarino, as purchaser. It describes property "165 x 165 at 235 
West 5th South." "Exhibit J" is an earnest money receipt 
agreement signed by Mrs. Harry Price and Mrs. Marcus Parr, 
as purchasers, and A. C. Mollerup, as seller. It describes cer-
tain property as "243-245-247-249 West 4th South (93% · 
feet by 206 feet and right of way, inc. acreage on Pleasant 
Court.)'' 
Mrs. Parr signed these exhibits the next day at noon in 
Mr. Hansen's office (R. 84). At the time "Exhibit J" was 
signed, the blank with respect to the interest on the unpaid 
balance of the purchase price was left blank because they did 
not know what interest rate was applicable. There was no 
issue as to the question, but the interest rate was to be obtained 
. from Mr. Rich and it was to be in the same amount "the rrio;t: 
gage had on it" (R. 135). 
Hansen called Mr. Price on the telephone September 
21st, after Mrs. Price had signed Exhibits E and J, and before 
Mrs. Parr had signed them.· Hansen told Mr. Price in that 
conversation that his wife had signed and that his sister would 
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be in to sign the next day. The terms contained in the exhibits 
\Yere explained in detail to Mr. Price in this conversation. 
J\Ir. Price replied that "he was willing to go along;" in fact, 
"he was perfectly fine about it, he seemed anxious (R. 82-83). 
Hansen told Price either in that conversation or in one the 
next day that the deal "was all signed up," and he asked 
Price "where we could get the abstracts." He was told that 
Ted Cannon had them. Hansen said that he would get them 
and have them brought up to date and examined and Price 
agreed (R. 84) . 
The two abstracts on the Price property were submitted to 
Edward M. Morrissey, an attorney representing plaintiff Angelo 
Ravarino, and the abstract on the Mollerup property was sub-
mitted to Mr. Ed Jensen, representing defendants (R. 84, 85). 
Exhibits L and P are title opinions which resulted from these 
examinations. 
Within three or four days after the signing of the agree-
ment by the two women, Hansen called Price and told him 
that Mr. Ravarino wanted to obtain some trackage owned by 
Mr. Roy Terry adjacent to defendants' property. Hansen told 
Price that he did not want Ravarino to buy a "goat farm" 
and that the 19-foot strip would certainly be of no interest 
to Ravarino unless he was to get defendant's property. Han-
sen's version of the conversation was, "Now, it looks like 
everything is O.K. and I just want to be sure there won't be 
any backing out, because I don't want to .close the deal on the 
Terry property. * * * I told him we were ready to close that 
now and I wanted to be sure there wouldn't be any trouble. 
* * * I said, 'If there is no objection I will go ahead and close 
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it.' He said: 'That's fine, go ahead.' I said: I want to be sure 
because if Ravarino has that it will be like a goat farm be-
cause he won't have any right of way to it.' So he assured me 
it was all right and we closed it right close to that date, I think 
October 5th was when we made the deal" (R. 87, 88). 
Angelo Ravarino obtained the Terry trackage and gave 
Hansen a check for $19,000 for defendants' property on the 
same day, October 5th (R. 88; Exhibit N). 
After the conversation between Price and Hansen regard-
ing the Terry property there is no question but that everyone 
. concerned believed that they had a deal; in fact, according to 
Mr. Rich, defendants took possession of the Mollerup property 
on October 1 and Harry Price was to sign up for the utilities 
on that date (R. 145). Between October 1st and October 11th 
Mr. Hansen notified Mr. Rich that Mr. Price had a question 
about the income tax feature of the property (R. 144). Mr. 
Rich then called a Mr. Wise of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
and asked whether if there was a trade property there would 
be an income tax to defendants. The transaction was explained 
as a "hypothetical question" (R. 144). Up until that con-
versation there was no different transaction than contained in 
Exhibits E and J (R. 144, 145 ). 
Mr. Rich then prepared Exhibits 0, H and F and these 
documents were submitted by Mr. Ed Jensen (R. 146). These 
documents were prepared in their present form for the con-
venience of defendants in this action and so that there might 
be a possible saving to them for income tax purposes (R. 101). 
Mr. Rich called Harry Price during this period of time and 
told him that Mollerup had ordered some merchandise on 
10 
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the strength of getting the money, and that he would lose his 
cash discount if the money was not paid. He said he would 
need $5000.00. Harry Price told Rich to get the money from 
Hansen. Harry told Rich in this conversation that "the papers 
will be signed as soon as the wife gets back from Denver" 
(R. 148, 149). 
On October 5th the closing documents were presented 
to Mr. Price for his signature. He stated that everything was 
all right but he wanted to go down to the county clerk's office 
and determine the value of the property as it was given at the 
time it was appraised in his father's estate and check some in-
come tax questions, and that he would sign on the following 
Monday (R. 149, 150). There was no question raised in these 
conversations as to interest or payments or down payment, 
because "that was all understood" (R. 150). Subsequently, 
Mr. Hansen called Mr. Price dozens of times and Mr. Price 
at all times indicated that he intended to complete the deal 
but that he would be out of town for a day or two and that 
he could not come in at that particular time (R. 94, 95, 96). 
Finally, Ed Jensen told Hansen that his client was "drag-· 
ging his feet" (R. 126). In November Price came in to see 
Hansen and told him that his property was "hot'"' and that he 
was not going through with the deal (R. 95) . 
On November 14, 1950, the same day that this lawsuit 
was filed, Mr. A. C. Mollerup addressed a letter entitled "Notice 
and Demand" to Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr (Ex. 1). The notice 
stated in substance that unless the transaction was completed 
before November 20th, Mr. Mollerup would consider him-
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-On November 18, 1950, Mr. Ed Jensen, representing Mrs. 
Price and Mrs. Parr, wrote to Mr. Mollerup and in effect 
demanded performance of the Mollerup contract in behalf of 
these persons, without interest on the $17,000 balance (Ex. I). 
There is no indication in Exhibit I that either Mrs. Price or 
Mrs. Parr are not bound by the transaction, or that they were 
bound only conditionally upon the acceptance of the deal by 
Harry Price; in fact, the tender in the le.tter and the demand 
was unconditional. Harry Price was still looking into the 
Mollerup property after the present lawsuit was filed in De-
cember. 
The principal factual issues before the Trial Court were 
as follows: 
( 1) Were the signatures of .2\1rs. Parr and Mrs. Price upon 
Exhibit E conditional? The defendants claimed at the trial 
that Hansen told them Exhibit E would not be binding until 
Harry Price signed it. Hansen denied this, and the Court found 
specifically that it was not signed conditionally. (Finding 
of Fact No.6; R. 251, 252). 
2. Was Exhibit E filled m, t.e. were the blanks filled 
in when it was signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr? The Court 
specifically found on this question that it was filled in, as con-
tended by plaintiff and as testified to by Hansen. (Finding of 
Fact No. 6; R. 252). 
3'. Did Ravarino purchase the Terry strip in reliance on 
an oral promise of Harry Price that he would conclttde the 
transaction? The Trial Court specifically found in Findings 
12 
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of Fact Nos. 6 and 10 that Price did in fact make such a rep-
resentation and that Ravarino did in fact rely upon it. 
4. Did the parties intend that all of defendants' property 
on Fifth South was to be included in the sale to plaintiff? The 
Trial Court specifically found that all of the property was 
included in the transaction (R. 250-251); in fact, it appears 
that at the time of defendants' first answer they themselves 
had no question that the entire lot 165 x 165 was to be con-
veyed. The breaking down of the property into two separate 
parcels appears to have been an afterthought, suggested by 
counsel after it appeared that there were separate abstracts. 
(See Par. 5 of defendants' first answer, R. 6). 
The primary question of law, therefore, became simply 
whether defendant Price was estopped in equity from asserting 
the statute of frauds as a defense in view of plaintiff's pur-
chase of the Terry strip in reliance on Price's acts and assur-
ances, combined with all other facts including the signatures 
of the two women and circumstances indicating that the par-
ties all thought they had completed the transaction. The 
Trial Court decided this question of law in plaintiff's favor. 
The record shows that the complaint in this action was 
filed on November 14, 1950. The answer was filed February 
9, 1951. A few days before the trial, to-wit: May 22, 1951, 
the defendants answered that they still denied that they were 
liable to plaintiff in any way, but "if plaintiff has been ag-
grieved or injured by purchase of said (Terry) strip, the de-
fendants herein are ready, willing and able to and hereby offer 
to pay plaintiff the purchase price which he paid to the former 
owners of said strip therefor upon plaintiff conveying to de-
13 
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fendant Harry Price, Jr., and defendant Mrs. Marcus Parr a 
good and marketable title thereto." Defendants now allege 
that they have made a sufficient tender so that they' do not 
have to perform their bargain. We think that the facts with 
respect to this tender speak for themselves. It will, of course, 
be argued further in this brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE 
, FACTUAL ISSUES ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
(a) The signatures of Mrs. Parr and Mrs. Price upon 
11Exhibit E," and their assent to the proposition therein con-
tained, were not conditional upon the signatures or assent of 
Harry Price. 
(b) The purchase money receipt identified as 11Exhibit E" 
was filled in and in its present form except for the signature 
of Ravarino at the time it was signed by Mrs. Price and Mt's. 
Parr. 
(c) Ravarino purchased the Terry strip in reliance upon 
Harry Price's promise to complete the transaction. 
(d) Both of the lots of defendants on Fifth South were 
included in the transaction. 
(e) The rule that the findings of the Trial Court on con-
flicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal is applicable 
in this case. 
14 
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POINT NO. II 
EXHIBIT E WAS THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
POINT NO. III 
DEFENDANT HARRY PRICE IS ESTOPPED IN 
EQUITY TO DENY HIS PROMISE AND AGREEMENT 




THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE 
FACTUAL ISSUES ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
There were a number of important and basic factual ques-
tions presented or the determination of the Trial Court. As 
heretofore Stated in this brief, appellants have not contended 
and apparently do not now contend that the findings of the 
Trial Court are not without support in the evidence. Appel-
lants do not directly challenge a single Finding of Fact or 
Conclusion of Law. Nevertheless, they purport to reargue 
all of the evidence as though this Court was to disregard all 
of the findings of the Trial judge. Appellants argue isolated 
bits of evidence which, considered individually, tend to con-
fuse the issues before the Trial Court, and certainly tend to 
15 
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unfairly present the issues before the Court on this appeal. 
Appellants could not, we submit, contend directly in view of 
all the evidence in this case that the Findings of Fact are not 
supported. 
Respondent most vigorously asserts that even in equity1 
if the Findings of Fact of the trial judge are supported by the 
evidence as they are in this case, those Findings will not be 
upset on appeal. We desire in this portion of the argument 
to point out to the Court the basic questions of fact involved 
in this case, and to invite the Court's attention to the evidence 
which supported each and all of those Findings. 
(a) The signatures of Mrs. Parr and Mrs. Price upon 
rr Exhibit E/' and their assent to the proposition therein con-
tained, were not conditional upon the signatures or assent of 
1-Iarry Price. 
From the beginning of the negotiations the defendant 
Price made it clear to Mr. Hansen that when the approval 
of Mrs. Price was obtained to the transaction, the others would 
be agreeable. After the earnest money receipt was signed by 
Mr. Ravarino offering $18,000 in cash for defendants' prop-
erty, Mr. Price came into Hansen's office and said, "My wife 
won't sign it." Hansen said, "Well, you told q1e there would 
be a sale, you didn't mention your wife, you mentioned your 
sister having to sign it and it would be allright." Whereupon 
Price said, "You will have to get hold of her, she really runs 
that end of it." So Hansen testified that he called Mrs. Price 
"that very day." Hansen told us that "she wouldn't, under 
any circumstances, sell that property for $18,000 and turn the 
$18,000 over to Harry. She said: "We will sell it but we want 
16 
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it to go in income property. If Harry has that money we don't 
know what will happen to it" (R. 77). 
It is submitted tha~ these are not the statements of a, 
woman who did not intend to be bound until her husband 
approved the deal. It is clear that Mrs. Price was the controlling 
influence in all of the business transactions relating to the 
property. The property, of course, belonged to Mr. Price 
and Mrs. Parr, but Mrs. Price managed the property, handled 
the income, drew the checks and she drew the check 
from the account concerning this property to give to Hansen 
as a deposit when Exhibit J was signed (R. 53, 163). 
After the first offer of Ravarino was declined, the primary 
dealings were with Mrs. Price. She was shown the Mollerup 
property by Mr. Rich, and the testimony is that Hansen showed 
various properties in Salt Lake City to her and Mrs. Parr. Mrs. 
Price arranged for Mr. Schluter to appraise defendants' prop-
erty and the Mollerup property (R. 51, 165, 166). 
It was only natural and logical that the conversation on 
September 21, 1950, which resulted in the signatures on Ex-
hibits E and J, should be held with Mrs. Price. The evidence 
is that these exhibits were prepared in a coffee shop below 
Mrs. Price's place of employment. At that time Mrs. Price 
related that Mr. Schluter thought the Price property was 
maybe a little low, and as a result Mr. Hansen filled out Ex-
hibit E to raise the amount on the Price property of $1000 and 
the Mollerup property was reduced from $36,000 to $35,000, 
"and so we made them both out right there and she signed them 
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apply on the Mollerup property, and said her sister would be 
in the next day at noon and sign it" (R. 80). 
Mr. Hansen denied that he ever told Mrs. Price that these 
documents would not be legal until Harry Price had signed 
them (R. 114). When Mrs. Parr came in the next day at noon, 
she signed Exhibits E and J without any question, and Mr. 
Hansen denied making any representations whatsoever to her 
(R. 82). Mrs. Price was not concerned about her husband's 
consent. She stated on cross-examination that she signed the 
exhibits without consulting him. There was no question about 
securing his approval of the transaction. The fact is, of 
course, that he approved of it, and that the whole thing was 
explained to him by telephone the same day that Mrs. Price 
signed the exhibits (R. 83, 84). 
When Mr. A. C. Mollerup served the Notice and Demand 
(Ex. 1) upon Mrs. Harry Price, Mrs. Marcus Parr and Hansen 
Realty Company, demanding performance of the earnest money 
receipt and agreement that was introduced into this case as 
"Exhibit]," the women did not at that time consider that they 
were not bound because the signature of Harry Price was not 
obtained. This notice was served on or about November 14, 
1950, on the same day that the complaint was filed in this 
action. Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr then went to see Ed Jensen, 
an attorney, and Mr. Price did not even attend the conference 
with them (R. 216, 217). There was no demand made for 
Mr. Price. Mr. Price was not in the conference and at that 
time the two women were in fact attempting to assert some 
rights in Exhibit J without any signature of Mr. Price being 
affixed to it (R. 217). 
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On November 18, 1950, Mr. Ed Jensen directed a letter 
to Mr. A. C. Mollerup, which letter was introduced in this 
action as "Exhibit I" as a result of the conferences with Mrs. 
Price and Mrs. Parr with respect to the notice introduced 
here as Exhibit 1. The last paragraph of Exhibit I commences 
with the language, "Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr demand that 
you sell the property above specified to them upon the terms 
and conditions set forth in the earnest money receipt. * * *" 
There apparently was no thought at this time that the sig-
natures of these document~ were conditional in any way. In 
fact, Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr are attempting to assert lia-
bility against Mollerup on the basis that Exhibit I ts com-
plete in itself. 
Even after this action was filed it does not appear that 
any of the defendants thought of the consent of Mrs. Price and 
Mrs. Parr and their signatures as being conditional. In Para-
graph 5 of the first answer defendants filed on or about Feb-
ruary 9, 1951~ defendants Mrs. Harry Price and Mrs. Marcus 
Parr admitted that they executed the agreement. They did 
not at that time assert any defense to the fact that they signed 
only conditionally upon the approval of Harry Price. 
It appears, in fact, that the first time this notion occurred 
to defendants was in the course of the preparation for trial. 
The record here is clear and convincing and the evidence is over-
whelming that when Exhibits E and J were signed by the tvvo 
women, they intended to be bound and they intended to per-
form the transaction according to the terms of Exhibit E. The 
suggestion that they might have had different intentions at 
the time appears clearly to have been an afterthought. There 
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is no rule of law to the effect that the signatures of one tenant 
in common is presumed to be conditional upon obtaining 
signatures of others, especially here, where there is no reliance 
placed upon the judgment of Harry Price throughout the 
entire deal. Instead, reliance was placed totally on the judg-
ment of Mrs. Price. She was the real guiding power behind 
the title to the property. It is not, of course, contended that 
she had authority to bind Harry Price as such, but it is certainly 
ridiculous, considering all the facts and circumstances, to assert 
here that she did not intend to be bound until her husband 
affixed his signature to the two exhibits. It can hardly be said 
that the Findings of the Trial Court on this question are not 
supported by the evidence. 
Appellants argue in Point IV of their brief that the en-
forcement of Exhibit E is inequitable as to the women because 
of an alleged misunderstanding of the contents and effect 
of that document. They argue that it was not filled in when it 
was signed and they argue that Mr. Hansen represented that 
they were bound unless the defendant Harry Price signed the 
exhibit. (Appellants' brief, 81-96). 
As elsewhere in their brief, defendants entirely skirted 
the obvious objection to their position in this regard, viz: that 
the Court found the facts against them. The Trial Court 
specifically, as herein stated and as stated in Point III of this 
brief, that Exhibit E constituted the agreement of the parties, 
and that they knew the contents of the exhibit when it was ex-
ecuted. The Court found squarely against them in their con-
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It is again pointed out to the Court that whether or not 
Hansen told them that their signaures were conditional would 
be purely a question of oral testimony, and the Court's con-
clusion was upon admittedly conflicting statements of the 
witnesses. The Trial Court heard and observed the witnesses. 
The finding of the Court is explicit. The entire argument of 
appellants was based upon a finding they hoped to obtain but 
in which they failed. The argument is entirely fallacious and 
irrelevant. 
The Court's finding on this point is also a complete answer 
to the point made by defendants in Sub-section 3 of their 
Point No. III. Exhibit E has not been charged or separated 
to make an agreement contrary to the intent of the parties. 
Exhibit E is the agreement of the parties, and when it was 
signed by the women, when Harry Price told Hansen to pro-
ceed to close the Terry transaction and the deal was all right 
with him, he and they were fully advised of the contents of 
that exhibit. 
Certainly the primary arguments of the defendants fail 
when they are reconsidered in the light of the findings of 
the Trial Court on the facts. 
(b) The purchase money receipt identified as rrExhibit E" 
was filled in and in its present form except for the signature 
of Ravarino at the time it was signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. 
Parr. 
One of the factual questions discussed in appellants' brief 
is whether Exhibits E and J were completed at the time they 
were signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr. Defendants and 
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appellants urge the Court to adopt their view of the matter, 
which was that they were signed in blank. The Trial Court 
found "that said contract (Earnest Money Receipt and Agree-
ment) was complete and the blanks all filled in as above set 
forth at the time Mrs. Parr and Mrs. Price signed said agree-
ment, and all defendants were aware of the terms of the agree-
ment and the signatures of sellers prior to the signature of 
plaintiff * * * ." 
The testimony of Mr. Hansen upon this question is as 
unequivocal and direct as testimony could possibly be. He 
testified as follows: 
"Q. Was both Exhibit E and J then filled in other 
than the signature of Mollerup and Ravarino? 
A. Exactly as they are--Mrs. Price was sitting here, 
and I was here, and they were made out just ex-
actly that way. 
Q. They were filled out in her. presence ? 
A. Right, no question in the world about that." (R. 
237). 
It is true that there is a conflict of evidence on this point. 
However, the Trial Court found directly and squarely that 
the blanks were filled in at the time the signatures of . Mrs. 
Price and Mrs. Parr were obtained. The record amply supports 
the finding of the Court, and there is no reason in this case 
why this finding should not be sustained on appeal. 
The findings of the Trial Court are a complete answer 
again to the arguments of appellants to the effect that Exhibit 
E is uncertain and the arguments made under Point IV that 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
some mistake was made by someone as to the transaction agreed 
upon. Certainly it is apparent from the record that women of 
the determina~ion and experience, and with the personalities 
of Mrs. Price and Mrs .. Parr, did not sign Exhibit E without 
knowing what they were doing. They had been discussing 
this transaction with Hansen for several weeks; particularly 
1\Irs. Price was fully aware of every detail, including a descrip-
tion of the property and the fact that defendants were receiv-
ing $19,000.00 in cash. The argument that defendants were 
unaware of the significance of their act is . most incongruous. 
Throughout their depositions all three of the defendants 
referred to their act as involving "their property on Fifth 
South." It is submitted that they knew perfectly well all of the 
implications of the writing on Exhibit E at the time it was 
signed and at all times subsequent thereto. 
(c) Ravarino purchased the Terry strip in reliance upon 
Harry Price's promise to complete the transaction. 
It is respondent's intention in this portion of the argu-
ment to invite the Court's attention to the various portions 
of the record which support the Trial Court's determination 
of the facts with respect to Harry Price's promise and Rava-
rino' s purchase of the Terry strip in reliance thereon. The 
legal effect of the facts will be argued in a separate point as 
a proposition of law. 
The Court found "that following the signing of said 
Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, and the oral assur-
ance of the defendant Harry Price, Jr., that he accepted, rati-
fied and acknowledged said contract and would sell the prop-
erty in accordance therewith, and after the said Harry Price, 
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Jr., had been advised by Hansen that the plaintiff intended to 
buy the said strip of property 19' x 66' adjoining the said 
property described in Paragraph 2 on the South, and after 
the said Hansen, having advised Harry Price, Jr., that the 
plaintiff would and could have no use for said property and 
would not buy it unless he was sure the said Harry Price, Jr., 
would complete the sale of said property described in Para-
graph 2 in accordance with the contract of sale, and after the 
assurance of said Harry Price, Jr., that he would sell the prop-
erty in accordance with the Earnest Money Receipt signed 
by his wife and sister, and relying upon the assurance of Harry 
Price, Jr., that he would convey as aforesaid, the said plain-
tiff then purchased the said adjoining strip of land 19' x 66' 
for the purchase price of $1,796.00; that Harry Price, Jr., 
with full knowledge aforesaid that plaintiff was going to buy 
said strip of property on the assurance of Harry Price, Jr., that 
he would sell and convey his property aforesaid in accord-
ance with the Earnest Money Receipt for the purpose of pro-
viding access to plaintiff to said property to be purchased from 
Harry Price, Jr., told the plaintiff to proceed with the purchase 
of said property and that he would convey in accordance with 
the Earnest Money Agreement" 
Appellants have argued in considerable length and with 
some considerable repetition that the purchase by Ravarino 
of the Terry strip was not in reliance upon the promise of 
Price to complete the transaction. Emphasis is placed on some 
testimony of Ravarino, Sr., from which it is apparent that 
Mr. Ravarino refers to a later conversation, in November, 
after Price had decided that his property was "too hot" to 
complete the transaction. 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It appears that Hansen had discussed the Terry strip with 
both plaintiff and defendants for some time prior to Sep-
tember 21st. Hansen stated: "I had an offer for a long time 
on the Terry property that could not go through until the 
Ravarinos were purchasing the Price property. * * * So the 
offer was held up until we were positive that the Prices were 
selling to Ravarinos" (R. 130). 
On September 21, 1950, the signatures of the two women 
were obtained on Exhibits E and J. The contents of Exhibit 
E were explicitly reported to Mr. Price on the same day that 
Exhibit E was signed by Mrs. Price and Mr. Price was informed 
at the same time that Mr. Honsen had available to him the 
$19,000.00 to complete the transaction (R. 97). Hansen ex-
plained to Price that the agreement was represented by Ex-
hibit E (R. 98) . 
Harry Price also knew of the particular importance of 
the Terry strip because Hansen had told him about it many 
times and had expressed the opinion to him that it was im-
portant that the Terry strip go with defendants' property (R. 
130, 131). 
A few days after September 21st, Hansen called Harry 
Price on the telephone and stated to him that "it looks like 
everything is okeh and I just want to be sure there won't be 
any backing out." Hansen told Price that Ravarino wanted 
to complete the transaction to obtain the Terry strip so that 
trackage would be available "to get freight cars in there from 
First South." Hansen said: "I told him we were ready to close 
that now and I wanted to be sure there wouldn't be any 
trouble." He said further: "I want to be sure because if Rava-
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rino has that it will be like a goat farm, because he won't 
have any right-of-way to it." Price assured Hansen, "It is 
all right" (R. 87, 88). The deed to the Terry property was 
obtained "close to that date, I think October 5th was when 
we made the deed" (R. 88). 
Hansen testified that after his conversation with Price 
he then saw Mr. Ravarino, and on October 5th he obtained 
the Terry deed, which was introduced into evidence in this 
case as "Exhibit N." The check from Angelo Ravarino for 
$19,000.00 was obtained apparently on the same date as the 
deed. Ravarino himself stated that he gave Hansen a check 
for $19,000.00 after the women had signed Exhibit E and 
that he signed the check at the time he bought the Terry 
property (R. 244). Ravarino told Hansen that he did not 
want the Terry property unless he was sure he was getting 
the Price property (R. 244). 
The Court's attention is invited to the fact that on Sep-
tember 29, 1950, the plaintiff had already submitted to Ed-
ward M. Morrissey, an attorney in Salt Lake City, the two 
abstracts of title introduced in this action as "Exhibit A" and 
"Exhibit B," and that Mr. Morrissey on that date wrote title 
opinions covering these abstracts. The opinions were intro-
duced in this case as "Exhibit L." This date is important be-
cause Harry Price turned over the abstracts to his attorney, 
Ted Cannon, for delivery to Mr. Morrissey prior, of course, 
to the date of their examination. Mr. Price certainly had un-
mistakably given evidence of his intention to be bound by the 
terms of "Exhibit E" at that time. It appears from Exhibit P," 
which is a title opinion from Mr. E. C. Jensen to l\1r. Ben C. 
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Rich, on the Mollerup property, that Mr. Price and the other 
defendants on that date considered that the deal was com-
pleted. Mr.. Jensen in that title opinion, "Exhibit P," gives 
various instructions for the clarification of the title to the 
ollerup property in anticipation of the unexpected conveyance 
to defendants in this action. 
"Exhibit K," a series of statements from McGhie Abstract 
& Tile Company to Hansen Realty, demonstrates that all 
of the abstracts in question were completed and the bill sent 
on or before September 28, 1950. 
The real estate men considered that defendants went 
into possession of the Mollerup property on October 1st (see 
testimony of Rich, R. 145), and Harry Pri~e saw no reason 
after his conversation with Hansen why Hansen could not 
turn over to Mollerup $5,000.00 of the $18,000.00 which was 
going from Ravarino to defendants (R. 148, 149). 
Following the actual delivery of the Terry deed to Rava-
rino, there ensued a number of telephone conversations be-
tween Hansen and Price. Hansen testified that Price talked 
with him on the telephone dozens of times and on each ~cca­
sion Hansen stated that he would be into sign the deeds and 
instruments of conveyance the next day, or that he was going 
out of town, or that he wanted to check one little angle or 
another, but always he was stating to Hansen that he intended 
to complete the transaction (R. 94, 95, 96). 
Finally, some time in November, Mr. Ed Jensen, who 
had been employed by Mr. Price to examine the abstracts 
on the Mollerup property, informed Mr. Hansen that he 
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thought his client was "dragging his feet," (R. 126) and it 
appears that in the early part of November, Mr. Price came 
into the office of Hansen Realty Company and stated to Hansen 
that "that is hot property, I am not going to go through with 
it" (R. 95). It appears that Mr. Price was never asked to 
sign "Exhibit E" (R. 96), but that he was advised as to every 
detail of "Exhibit E" and that he knew that the Terry deed 
had been obtained and paid for in reliance on his promise to 
complete the transaction according to the Exhibit (R. 96). 
Harry Price considered that the deal was made. 
The fact is that Hansen had a conversation with Price 
to the effect that Hansen should pay a mortgage in the amount 
o f$1500.00 to the Tracy Loan & Trust Company out of the 
mon~y that Hansen had from Ravarino to pay to defendants 
(R. 97). Price saw no reason why Hansen should not turn 
$5,000.00 over to him for him to give Mollerup, so that 
Mollerup could get certain discounts on merchandise he had 
purchased (R. 148, 149). 
There can be absolutely no doubt that the Trial Court 
was not only justified but virtually .compelled to find, in view 
of this overwhelming and convincing evidence, that Price knew 
exactly the terms of the transaction intended by the parties, 
and that he knew that Ravarino did not intend to proceed 
further with the Terry deal until Price had given his consent. 
At the time Hansen talked with Price about the Terry strip, no 
one had any doubt as to what was expected of Mr. Price. Mr. 
Hansen said in substance and effect that Ravarino wanted to 
buy the Terry property, provided that Price was willing to 
complete the transaction pursuant to the provisions of Exhibit 
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E. Mr. Price replied unequivocally that he would proceed 
with the transaction and Mr. Ravarino proceeded to acquire 
the Terry strip in reliance upon this representation. 
The Trial Court so determined the facts. Judge Baker in 
effect found the fact to be as contended by plaintiff in his 
complaint in this action. Certainly the evidence justifies this 
finding. There is no question but what the finding is clear 
and that it correctly reflects the record with respect to the 
subject matter it contains. The very fact that the appellants 
in this case do not endeavor to controvert the finding is m-
dicative o\ the weightiness which it carries. 
Appellants argue on Pages 30 and 31 of their brief 
that no reliance can be placed upon these brief remarks, be-
cause they do not "constitute any kind of a promise or offer 
at all." Certainly the Court must be aware of the manner in 
which assent is manifest in the business world. Businessmen 
rarely say, with technical nicety, "I offer to do thus and so" 
and answer "I accept the offer." The conversation which Harry 
Price had with Hansen cannot be considered outside of the 
context in which it occurred. Hansen said in substance, are 
you or are you not going to proceed with this deal ? My client 
desires to know so that he can protect his interests accord-
ingly. 
Mr. Price realized the significance of his own words 
because he considered himself bound after the conversation, 
and, in fact, at all times up through the date in November 
in which he repudiated the transaction he dealt with the prop-
erty involved as though he was bound, and there is nothing 
ambiguous or uncertain in his dealing toward any of it. 
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Ravarino purchased the Terry property immediately following 
the conversation. He gave Hansen $19,000.00 at the same 
time, clearly indicating that he believed, with Price, that the 
bargain was complete, that only the detail of obtaining the 
deed remained. 
(d) Both of the lots of defendants on Fifth South were 
included in the transac.tion. 
Appellants state on Page 5 of their brief that the "un-
disputed testimony" is that only the lot with the warehouse 
upon it on Fifth South was to be conveyed in the transaction 
involved in this lawsuit. Probably no portion of appellants' 
argument is more indicative of their efforts to create confusion 
after this dispute arose over facts that were perfectly well 
understood at the time the transaction was agreed upon than 
is this argument. The two women come into court and testi-
fy that only one lot is involved when they have signed an 
Earnest Money Receipt describing the property as 165 x 165 
feet, and when it appears that all the negotiations with ref-
erence to the sale of the property included all of defendants' 
property on Fifth South. What appellants refer to as "un-
disputed testimony" in their brief appears to be somewhat of 
an ingenious afterthought. Certainly the Trial Court would 
not have been justified in finding anything else than that the 
entire tract on Fifth South, 165 x 165 feet, was to be sold to 
plaintiff. 
It is particularly interesting that appellants contend that 
this Court should reverse the Trial Court on the fact that 
because the "documentary evidence tells the whole story," 
and yet they assert that these women believed, despite the 
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unambiguous dscription in Exhibit E, that only part of the 
land was involved. The fact is that every document intro-
duced in evidence in this case demonstrates that defendants 
thought all of their property was being sold. Defendant Harry 
Price admits explicitly that there was no misunderstanding 
on his part. He knew that all the property was involved from 
the very beginning. There was no occasion for him to discuss 
any different arrangement with his wife (R. 236). 
Attention is again invited to the finding of the Trial 
Court and the evidence supporting the finding that at the 
time Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr signed Exhibit E it was filled 
in and in its present form, describing the lot 165 x 165 feet 
(R. 2}7). 
Both abstracts covering in the aggregate the same prop-
erty described in the Earnest Money Receipt were turned over 
to plaintiff's attorney for examination, and the opinions of 
Edward M. Morrissey describe both pieces of property. They 
are dated September 29, 1950, after the entire transaction was 
worked out and agreed upon. The documents, of transfer 
(Exhibit G and Exhibit 0) describe all of defendants' prop-
erty on Fifth South. These documents ·were present at the 
conversations which occurred in Hansen's office after the pur-
chase of the Terry strip (R. 91). No objection was raised 
to any of these descriptions at the time of these conversations 
(R. 91, 92). Apparently there was no doubt at this time that 
the Fifth South property was being conveyed, because the 
defendants and real estate men were present at these conver-
sations. Moreover, these documents or copies were submitted 
to Ed Jensen (R. 146), and apparently he had them in his 
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possession at the time he prepared the Demand to Mr. Mol-
lerup (R. 92, 207, 208). Even at the time the first 
answer was prepared and filed on or about February 9, 1951, 
there was no question about the description of the property 
in Exhibit E (R. 5 and particularly Par. 5). The evidence 
upon which defendants base their argument in this respect 
is certainly most unreliable; it consists of the statements of 
the women as to their state of mind and the appraisal of Mr. 
Schulter, made out of the presence of any other witnesses. 
It appears from the record that like several other of the 
defenses, the suggestion that there was only intended to be 
one lot conveyed to Mr. Ravarino was an afterthought, in-· 
spired by the placing of the case upon the trial calendar. Cer-
tainly there is ample and convincing support in the evidence 
for the finding of the Trial Court that all of defendants' 
property was included in the transaction. 
(e) The rule that the findings of the Trial Court .on con-
flicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal is applicable 
in this case. 
While the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article VIII, 
Section 9, gives this Court the power to review factual as well 
as legal questions on appeal in equity cases, this Court has 
uniformly held that the finding of the Trial Court on conflict-
ing evidence in an equity case will not be set aside, unless the 
Trial Court manifestly misapplied facts or made findings 
against the great weight of the evidence. Olivero v. Eleganti, 
61 Ut. 475, 214 Pac. 313; Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Ut. 329, 226 
Pac. 177; Bennett v. Bowen, 65 Ut. 444, 238 Pac. 240; Hansen 
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l'. iVlutual Finance Corporation, et al., 84 Ut. 579, 37 Pac. 
(2d) 782; Hoyt z·. Upper lYiarion Ditch Co., 94 Ut. 134, 134, 
76 Pac. (2d) 234; Stanley Z'. Stanley, 97 Ut. 520, 94 Pac. (2d) 
465; Tanner v. Provo Reset·voir Co., 99 Ut. 139, 98 Pac. 
(2d) 695; rehearing denied 99 Ut. 158, 103 Pac. (2d) 134; 
Bear River State Bank z·. L1lerrill, 101 Ut. 176, 120 Pac. (2d) 
325; Prowitt v. Lunt, 103 Ut. 574, 13·7 Pac. (2d) 361. 
This rule has been uniformly applied in equity cases and 
has been held applicable in varying factual circumstances. 
The rule has been variously stated by this court and has been 
variously stated as well by courts of other jurisdictions, but 
the fundamental meaning and purpose of the rule is clear. 
Where the trial court has seen the witnesses, observed their 
demeanor on the wittess stand, has heard the entire evidence, 
it is, of course, in a better position to judge the credibility 
of witnesses and to determine what inferences might properly 
be drawn from the various testimony. 
It is submitted that in this case there is no justification 
for failure to apply this rule ~o the ultimate factual questions. 
Admittedly there was a considerable disparity in the testimony 
of the defendants and the other witnesses with respect to 
certain basic factual questions. The defendants and appel-
lants, however, do not even argue directly that the findings 
of the Trial Court were not supported by the evidence. Con-
flicting inferences might be drawn and more weight might 
be given to certain testimony than to other testimony, evidence 
and circumstances proved to the Court, but the Trial Court 
observed and analyzed all of these circumstances and contra-
dictions. The conflicts and the evidence were resolved and 
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. 
the Trial Court made its findings with respect to the ultimate 
questions of fact in issue. 
It is felt that a careful reading of the record will con-
clusively demonstrate that the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom preponde-
rates in favor of the plaintiff's position throughout the 
proceedings. The findings are supported by the evidence and 
the findings are not disputed by any uncontroverted evidence 
in the case. 
The appellants assert that "the documentary evidence 
tells the whole story," and "on these documents rests also any 
question of credibility here so that this Court is in as good 
a position on such matters as the tria\ court" (Appellants' 
brief, Page 4). No sooner have the appellants spoken these 
words, however, than they proceed to explain to the Court 
in their Statement of Facts and in their Argument the reliance 
placed upon conversations between and among the parties 
in the case. 
It is perfectly apparent from reading the appellants' 
brief, and from the discussion of the factual issues in this 
brief, that the documents do not tell the whole story. The 
entire theory against the defendant Harry Price is equitable 
estoppel and is based upon some oral statements made by 
him to the real estate agent handling the transaction for the 
plaintiff in this case. If the documents tell the whole story, 
then why is it possible for the defendants Mrs. Price and 
Mrs. Parr to contradict, argue with, dispute and attempt to 
evade the plain and unambiguous language on Exhibit E, 
introduced in this action? It is too plain for argument that 
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the documents do not tell the whole story, and that it was 
necessary in this case to resort to the testimony of witnesses 
concerning conversations and occurrences outside of any 
written or undisputed evidence or testimony. 
POINT NO. II 
"EXHIBIT E" WAS THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
The greater part of defendants' brief has been an attempt 
to avoid the fact that Exhibit E was the contract for the sale 
of defendants' property. In reply to that we wish to submit 
the following to the Court. 
In Finding No. 6 Judge Baker sets forth in full "Exhibit 
E" and finds that it was signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr 
with knowledge that Harry Price, Jr., had approved the terms, 
and that the signatures of Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr were not 
affixed conditionally in any manner whatsoever; that all de-
fendants were aware of the terms of the Agreement, and that 
plaintiff signed the Agreement two or three days after the sign-
ing and approval of that Agreement by defendants; that all de-
fendants agreed to sell to plaintiff the said land in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Agreement, and that plaintiff agreed to purchase in ac-
cordance with that Agreement; that Harry Price, Jr., ratified, 
approved and acknowledged the contract as his own and is 
estopped to assert the defense of the statute of frauds for 
his failure to sign the Agreement. 
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Ravarino was only concerned with the purchase of the 
Price property. What the Prices did with this purchase money 
was of no concern to him. Whether Price bought other prop-
erty, bought stocks or put it in a bank account was of no concern 
to Ravarino so long as he received his property. 
Mr. Ben C. Rich, a real estate agent having the listing 
for sale of the Mollerup property, said in his testimony (R. 
140): 
"A. Well, Mr. Hansen called me up and said he had 
a deal on to sell the Price property to the Rava-
rinos, that Mrs. Price wouldn't sell unless we found 
her a piece of good investment property to put the 
money in and wanted to know if the Mollerup 
property was still available." 
Mr. Rich then indicated the events in which the property 
had been shown to the parties. Then at R. 140 he stated: 
"Q. When was the next incident that occurred? 
A. When Mr. Hansen informed me he had an offer 
on the property signed by the Prices. 
Q. And what was the next thing you did after that con-
versation? 
A. I went down and picked up the offer and took it 
down to Mr. Mollerup. 
"Mr. Mollerup looked it over . . . it was for 
some less than Mr. Mollerup was asking for the 
property, but it called for $18,000.00 cash and he 
had rieed for the money in his business at that 
time ... " 
At R. 142 Rich states: 
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"Q. What was the next thing you did in connection 
with this transaction? 
A. I got the abstracts from lvlr. 11ollerup, sent them 
down to Ed Jensen to examine." 
At R. 143: 
"Q. Had anything been said up to the time the date 
of that letter, October 11th, about there being any 
trade in this matter ? * * * 
A. Yes." 
At Page 144 of the record: 
"Q. Can you tell me about the date of this conver-
sation? 
A. It was between this period of October 1st and Oct. 
11th. 
* * * * 
Q. Did you ever have any discussions with Mr. Price 
relative to any income problems he might have 
arising out of the sale of his property ? 
A. The information came to me from Mr. Hansen, 
that Mr. Price was worried about the income feat-
ures of the property, of the deal, so I told Mr. 
Hansen that I would check up with the Internal 
Revenue Bureau and get a ruling on it. 
Q. And that conversation you have given was dated 
sometime between October 1st and October 11th? 
A. So I called the Internal Revenue Bureau, setting the 
facts of this transaction as a hypothetical question, 
I didn't state the names of the parties, I just 
called Mr. Wise, giving him the facts of this hypo-
thetical question. I asked if it would be taxable . 
. )7 
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He said not tor trade, income property would be 
tax free and I related that information to Mr. 
Hansen. 
* * * * 
Q. Up to the point of the conversation with Mr. Han-
sen as far as you know there was no transaction, 
no writing, no oral statement different than the 
provision of Exhibit J which you have there, the 
earnest money receipt? 
A. Not as far as we are concerned there was not." 
Again at R. 145 Mr. Rich states; 
"Q. I will ask you this, what was this $18,000.00 
to be? 
A. It was to be money, cash." 
Again at R. 156, on cross-examination, Mr. Mulliner asked 
Mr. Rich this, question and received this answer: 
"Q. And as far as you knew the deal as it was ex-
pected to go was a trade of the Price and the Mol-
lerup property? 
A. No, as originally signed up, it was· a cash deal to 
Mr. Mollerup as it was originally signed up but 
it was adjusted later to this to help Mr. Price's tax 
situation." 
In the examination of Mrs. Parr at R. 198 appears the 
following testimony: 
" * * * Well, you see if we have this: You were 
selling to Ravarino, which determined the value that 
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The following is the excerpt from the deposition of Mrs. 
Parr as it appears at R. 195: 
"ANSWER: No, when I talked to my sister-in-law 
what was to be done, we were to pay so much down 
and the balance in monthly payments at a set price * * * 
QUESTION: The amount that you paid down would 
be the amount you would get from the Ravarino sale? 
ANSWER: Uh huh." 
From all the foregoing it is clear that as indicated by the 
evidence, there were two separate contracts, Exhibit E for 
the sale and purchase of the Price property and Exhibit J for 
the sale and purchase of the Mollerup property. As to the 
Mollerup property, the sum realized by the Prices and Mrs. 
Parr from the sale of their property was to be used as the 
down payment for the purchase of the Price property., 
Exhibit E, as found by Judge Baker, was fully understood 
and known by both the Prices and Ravarino, was exhibited 
by them, and the evidence amply supports the Finding of 
Judge Baker that the parties intended to proceed in accord-
ance with its terms and were bound by it. The details of 
arranging for the conveyance to Mollerup were of no conse-
quence to Ravarino so long as he received title to the property. 
The fact that Price desired to have title come to Ravarino 
through Mollerup was not even known by Ravarino until 
after Exhibits E and J were signed (R. 109). 
The original answer of defendants contained no reference 
to any "trade" rather than sale. The claim to an exchange 
agreement first appeared in the amended answer of May 22, 
1951, filed just prior to the trial setting in the spring of 1951. 
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It is, of course, clear from the record that the conversa-
tion between Mr. Price and Mr. Hansen which resulted in the 
purchase of the Terry property was a few days after the execu-
tion of Exhibits E and J by the women. Prior to this conver-
sation, Hansen had explained every detail of the transaction 
to Harry Price. 
Argument is made in appellants' brief to the effect that 
the· plaintiff did not rely upon Price's promises when he pur-
chased the Terry strip. Appellants refer to some testimony of 
Ravarino when Price said, 'Tm going on the road five or 
six days and when I come back I will let you know, yes pr no." 
This argument could be answered appropriately under 
Point III of this brief, but since it also concerns the agreement 
of the parties and the relationship that existed because of that 
agreement, it is mentioned here. The conversation referred 
to by Ravarino in which Price said, "I will let you know, 
yes or no,'' clearly occurred long after the rights of the parties 
had become fixed because of the execution of Exhibits E and 
J and the purchase of the Terry property. It is perfectly clear 
that Mr. Ravarino never met Mr. Price until sometime toward 
the last part of October or the first part of November, when 
Price went down to see them at their place of business. Price 
himself states that he only had one conversation in his life 
with Ravarino (R. 234), and that occurred in Ravarino's 
office at approximately the time the summons was served upon 
Price in this action (R. 235). It resulted from Hansen's call 
to Price in which Price was told that "Ravarino is really on 
my back." Ravarino was told in this conversation by Price that 
"I didn't think I was going through with that deal." 
. 40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is interesting to note that Price was told at this time 
that the Terry strip had been purchased and that the architect 
had been employed to draw the plans and the steel had been 
purchased, apparently for the construction of a building. 
Price's remark was "that's up to you, he hasn't my property, 
and that's up to you buying that strip." Price stated that he 
t..'lought "they got a little wild about it, especially the elderly 
Mr. Ravarino" (R. ibid.) This was the only conversation 
which Price ever had with Ravarino, and it is somewhat ridicu-
lous for appellants to try to breathe something into the testi-
mony of Mr. Ravarino, particularly in view of the obvious 
language difficulties he was having during his examination 
and cross-examination. All Ravarino said about his conversation 
with Price was that even at that late time he was told that the · 
two women were still willing to proceed on the transaction 
but that Harry Price was welching on the deal. This is con-
sistent with the notice given by Ed Jensen to Mollerup that 
the women were ready to proceed. 
Even at this, late time Harry Price, m his conversation 
with Ravarino, was not making any alibis for not performing 
along the lines of the defenses made in this case. There is no 
indication that there was any question in his mind that the 
plaintiff was entitled to the property. There was no question 
that Exhibit E did not constitute the agreement. The only 
excuse for non-performance that Harry Price suggested to 
anybody until after this lawsuit was well underway was that 
his property was "hot" and that he "was not going through 
with that deal" (R. 23 5) . 
Appellants have attempted in this case, by the selection 
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of approximately a half dozen lines of the testimony of Angelo 
Ravarino, to support their position that the terms of the 
agreement were not definite and that there was no reliance by 
Ravarino upon Price's promise at the time Ravarino purchased 
the Terry strip. The quotation from Ravarino's testimony is: 
"I signed that and at the same time we buy Terry property, see?" 
Counsel for appellants have misquoted this statement of the 
record to have it read as follows: "I signed that (Exhibit E) 
at the same time we buy the Terry property, see." The leaving 
out of the word "and" is certainly most significant in the 
testimony of the elderly Italian who has the evident difficulty 
with the English language as did Angelo Ravarino. The fore-
going appears at Page 244 of the record. 
Again we quote: "I gave Mr. Hansen one week. You 
know he come so many times in my place, so I gave Mr. 
Hansen one week, if you fix it up, fix it up for 19,000, okey, 
I give you one week.'' 
Here again counsel have omitted the significant part 
of the testimony which appears at page 242 of the record, 
. wherein the following is to be added to the testimony of 
Ravarino, identifying the time and the date which he might 
have had in mind in referring to Exhibit E: "Two, three 
days later he came and bring me that book and say Mrs. Price 
and Price's sister they all fix up and sign and I give this thing, 
I give it to my lawyer-." The foregoing appears on Page 242 
of the record. 
Counsel also omit from Ravarino' s testimony the follow-
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"Q. Did you ask Mr. Hansen before you bought the Terry 
property if the deal was closed because you didn't 
want the Terry property without the Price prop-
erty? 
A. Mr. Hansen said Mrs. Price and Price's sister they 
sign and everything will be okeh, and the time was 
okeh and everything will be okeh that time. He 
said, 'You better get the money ready so we can 
pay them.' That is when I gotand cash $11,000.00 
U. S. Bonds and I never get nothing, if I have it 
now I have 11,000, I lose already 1,600 besides 
that, let me tell you." 
"MR. H. L. MULLINER: I object to it, Your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. BURTON): Now, in the conversation 
to Hansen, was anything said about your not want-
ing the Terry property unless you were sure you 
had the Price property? 
A. Sure, I told him. 
MR. H. L. MULLINER: Let me state, the Court 
please, Mr. Hansen told us what it was, what is 
the use of coming back with this now? 
MR. BURTON: It is to show-
THE COURT: Well, he answered the question. 
MR: BURTON: That is all." 
From the foregoing it is clear that Mr. Mulliner, Sr., 
had conceded to the Court and counsel that Hansen had given 
the story of the conversation with Price in reliance on which 
Ravarino proceeded to buy the Terry property. 
In the face of this explicit concession made by counsel 
during the trial, the appellants come back in their brief, fol-
lowing ·a brief cross-examination of the witness on the very 
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subject, through the use of approximately a hair dozen lines 
of his testimony, and assert that he did not rely upon Price's 
promise in the purchose of the Terry property. 
It is submitted that the whole record demonstrates the 
certainty of the agreement and the definiteness of the reliance 
thereupon by the plaintiff in the purchase of the Terry strip. 
POINT NO. III 
DEFENDANT HARRY PRICE IS ESTOPPED IN 
EQUITY TO DENY HIS PROMISE AND AGREEMENT 
TO BE BOUND PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF EX-
HIBIT E. 
The Trial Court found and the evidence is that the follow-
ing developments occurred in sequence: 
( 1) Harry Price signed the listing agreement with Hansen 
for the sale of the Fifth South property owned by the de-
fendants (R. 250}. 
( 2) Hansen reported an offer to Price, who reported it 
to his wife. Hansen was told by Price that the offer did not 
agree with Mrs. Price, particularly because she wanted other 
income property, and everything he could work out with Mrs. 
Price would be agreeable and acceptable to Harry Price. 
( 3) Mr. and Mrs. Price were both shown the Mollerup 
property and after some discussion Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr 
signed "Exhibit E" and "Exhibit J" in their present form. 
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( 4) "Exhibit E.. was explained in every detail to Mr. 
Price by Mr. Hansen. Every requirement and provision of 
Exhibit E was explained to and discussed by Mr. Price. 
( 5) Abstracts were brought to date and examined, and 
a few days after th;; explanation of Exhibit E to Mr. Price, 
Hansen told Price that the plaintiff Ravarino desired to pur-
chase the Terry strip of trackage. Price was told that Ravarino 
did not want to buy the strip unless Price was going through 
with the transaction as explained to him. He further was told 
that the strip would be nothing more than a goat farm unless 
he agreed to sell to the plaintiff in conformity with the agree-
ment of the two women. Hansen was told by Price in this 
conversation to go ahead with the deal and for Ravarino to buy 
the Terry strip. 
( 6) The plaintiff Ravarino did in fact purchase the Terry 
strip and the deed of conveyance was executed to him. At the 
same time plaintiff left with Hansen for delivery to defendants 
the purchase price for the Fifth South property. 
(7} Closing documents were prepared and approved and 
possession taken of the Mollerup property. 
( 8) Various telephone conversations occurred between 
Price and Hansen on the one hand and Hansen and Ed .Jensen, 
representing Price, and after a number of such conversations, 
Jensen told Hansen that Price was dragging his feet. 
(9) About the first part of November, Price told Hansen 
that his property was 'too hot to sell," in substance, and that 
he was refusing to go along with the deal. 
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Of particular importance, of course, is the conversation 
between Mr. Price and Mr. Hansen, and that conversation 
has been reported in detail to the Court in this brief. There 
is no question, and can be no doubt, that the plaintiff pur-
chased the land from the Terrys in direct reliance upon Price's 
statement to Hansen that he, Price, would convey the land. 
The real question in this case is whether under the circum-
stances, and in view of the factual determinations of the Trial 
Court with respect to the controverted issues of fact, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable. 
This presents the real legal issue in the case. We submit 
that the appellants have skirted the problem, dodged it and 
attempted to evade it. The Trial Court, however, faced it 
squarely and concluded that defendant Harry Price was 
estopped under all the facts and circumstances to deny liability 
pursuant to the understanding expressed in Exhibit E. We 
think this Court will affirm the determination of the Trial 
Court on this question upon a full consideration of the basic 
doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied to the facts. 
The doctrine is, of course, a development of the chan-
cellor to avoid the harshness and frequently the downright in-
justice of the Statute of Frauds. Pomeroy describes generally 
the doctrine in Section 803 of his work on equity jurispru-
dence, (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Volume 2, 
pages 163·5, etc.) He defines the doctrine as follows: 
"Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary 
conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded 
both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which 
might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of prop-
,16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
erty, of contract, or of remedy, as against another 
person, who has in good faith relied upon such con-
duct, and has been led thereby to change his position 
for the worse, and who on his part acquires some cor-
responding right, either of property, of contract, or 
of remedy." 
Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed, Sec. 804. The 
doctrine is stated in Corpus Juris as follows: 
"As a general rule, where a person with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the facts induces ·another 
by his words or conduct to believe that he acquiesces or 
ratifies a transaction, or that he will offer no opposi-
tion thereto, and that another, in reliance on such be-
lief, alters his position, such person is estopped_ from 
repudiating the transaction to the other's prejudice. 
(31 CJ 112). 
Appellants in their brief apparently take the position that 
there must both be part performance and fraud for the appli-
cation of the doctrine of equitable estappel (Appellants' Brief 
Point 2, particularly pages 41, etc.) Appellants' argument in 
this respect, however, which seems to infer that both part per-
formance and equitable estoppel must be proved to make a 
case, is totally lacking in substance and is certainly an improper 
analysis of the basic doctrine involved. The editor of 75 ALR, 
651, discusses the historical and analytical relations between 
the doctrines of estoppel and part performance as a basis for 
the enforcement of contracts. He states: 
"One cause of the misconception of the basis of the 
doctrine of part performance probably lies in the 
requisite of this doctrine that the acts relied upon 
must have been done in pursuance of the contract, and 
must be referable thereto. This requirement is pri-
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marily intended not to assure the probative integrity 
of the acts in question, but to show that the plaintiff 
relied upon the agreement and upon the defendant's 
inducement or acquiescence, such reliance being a pre-
requisite element of estoppel. The relative trustworthi-
ness of the acts as evidence was probably considered 
by the courts in formulating and limiting the doctrine 
of part performance; but, if so, this consideration was 
merely an argument in favor of the feasibility and safe-
ness of applying principles of estoppel in such cases, and 
was not the real basis of the doctrine. In other words, 
this consideration may have been a justification of the 
doctrine, but it was not the basis thereof." 
The editor concludes, after quoting Story on Equity Juris-
prudence, 14th Ed. Sec. 1005, 1047, and Pomery Equity Juris-
prudence, 4th Ed. Sec. 1409, that: 
"The weight of authority recognizes the rule to be 
based upon estoppel or fraud." 
The editor states significantly at the conclusion of the an-
notation: 
"Estoppel, to assert the statute of frauds, is no 
more a subversion of the law than is estoppel to take 
advantage of any other firmly established legal prin-
ciple, whether embodied in a statute or not. The 
principle of estoppel is of equal dignity with the statute 
of frauds, and is perhaps even more indispensable as 
a protection against fraud." (Emphasis supplied). 
Attention is invited to the further fact that the fraud 
concerned is not actual fraud in the sense of "a willful decep-
tion, but simply it is unconscientious; much less do they assert 
that there was actual fraud-willful deception-in the act 
of entering into the verbal contract." (See Pomery Equity 
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Juprisprudence, supra, Sec. 803, where the author points out 
that the fraud which constitutes the estoppel may consist of 
of acts, words, or silence, with or without an intention to de-
ceive.) 
Attention is also invited to the annotations at 101 A.L.R. 
923, 945, et seq. with respect to the doctrine of part perform-
ance in suits in equity for specific performance of parol con-
tracts to convey real estate and the Comment Note at 117 
A.L.R. 939 concerning the relationship between the doctrines of 
equitable estoppel and part performance. 
It now appears as to be well established that the doctrine 
that part performance will take an oral contract out of the 
statute of frauds rests essentially upon the ground of estoppel. 
See Wolfe, Administratrix, et al. vs. Wallingford ... Bank & 
Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 Atl. (2d) 143, 117 A.L.R. 932. 
The following language of ~he Court in that case is of interest 
in the case at bar: 
"The estoppel in such a case as the one before us 
makes enforcible an agreement in all respects com-
plete and valid except that compliance with the statute 
of frauds is lacking; by preveting the defendant from 
setting up that statute to defeat his agreement. Inso-
far as DeLucia vs. Witz, 92 Conn. 416, 103 Atl. 117, 
is contrary to the conclusion here reached, it must be 
overruled. 
"Two other claims of the defendant require but 
brief mention. One is that an actual design or intent 
to deceive or defraud must exist in the maker at the 
time of his representation or promise to afford the 
basis of an estoppel. The law is not so. 'In this con-
nection the meaning given to fraud or fraudulent is 
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virtually synonymous with unconscientious or inequit-
able. The fraud may and generally does consist of the 
subsequent attempt to controvert the representation 
and to get rid of its effects, and~)hus to injure the 
one who has relied on it, or, as it has been stated, 
equitable estoppel arises when the conduct of the 
party estopped is fraudulent in its purpose or unjust 
in its results.' 10 R.C.L. 691, Sec. 20; Seymour vs. 
Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 796, 106 Pac. 88, 94, 134 Am. 
St. Rep. 154.'' 
It is, of course, clear that equitable estoppel is available 
with respect to a defense of the statute of frauds. The editor 
of Ruling Case Law states: 
"It has frequently been asserted as a broad general 
rule that a. court of equity will not permit a party to 
shelter himself under the defense of the statute and 
thereby commit a fraud on the other party to the con-
tract. This principle is not limited to any particular 
class ·of contracts and has been applied to a contract 
of employment not to be performed within a year. 
An equitable estoppel may also be invoked to pre-
clude a party to a contract from setting up the defense 
of the statute, and it is now generally recognized that 
permitting the doctrine of equitable estoppel to operate 
in effect to transfer title to real estate does not contra-
vene the statute.'' 
The principle of equitable estoppel has been explicitly 
adopted by this Court. See Hilton v. Slo.an, 37 Utah, 359; 108 
Pac. 689; Kerr v. Hillyard, 51 Utah 364, 170 Pac. 981; Tanner 
v. Provo Reservoir Co. et al., 76 Utah, 335, 289 Pac. 151; 
Bamberger Co. et al. vs. Certified Productions, Inc. et al., 88 
Utah 194, 48 Pac. (2d) 489; Latses vs. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 
Utah 214, 104 Pac. (2d) 619. As stated by the Court in Bam· 
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berger Co. z·s. Certified Productions, Inc. et al., supra, in the 
opiinon of Judge Wolfe: 
"As stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo, then justice of 
the Court of Appeals of New York, in Imperator 
Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263, 266: . 
'Sometimes the resulting disability has been character-
ized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver * * *. We 
need not go into the question of the accuracy of the 
description. * * * The truth is that we are facing a 
principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or 
estoppel, one with roots in the yet larger principle that 
no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon 
his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong. 
* * * The statute of frauds was not intended to offer 
an asylum of escape from that fundamental principle 
of justice.' 
"We accept this principle. If a party has changed his 
position by performing an oral modification so that 
it would be inequitable to permit the other party to 
found a claim upon the original agreement as unmodi-
fied or defeat the former's claim by setting up a defense 
that performance was not according to the written · 
contract, after he has induced or consented to the former 
going forward, the modified agreement should be held 
valid." 
and this even though the modification was within the statute 
of frauds. 
While it may be true that there never has been a case 
exactly like the one· at bar, the principle of equitable estoppel 
should certainly be applied to the facts in this case, that prin-
ciple being, "that he who by his language or conduct leads 
another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall 
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not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the 
expectations upon which he acted." 75 A.L.R. 642, 646. 
Can there be any doubt that these principles are applicable 
to the case at bar? 
Attention is again invited to the testimony of Hansen 
to the effect that Price unequivocally and definitely stated that 
he would go along with the deal and to go ahead and purchase 
the Terry property. 
It is to be observed in the case at bar that the plaintiff 
purchased an interest in real property adjoining the property 
owned by the defendants in reliance upon the promise of Price. 
Of course, the piece of property that he purchased was in the 
nature of an improvement to the defendants' property. How 
can one imagine a more valuable improvement to property of 
this kind than an adjoining piece of trackage? The trackage 
has no value in itself and, in fact, is absolutely worthless. It 
constitutes truly a 'goat farm" in the language of the real estate 
agent Hansen if it is not used with other property, but it 
is in the nature of a valuable real property interest when used 
in connection with the real property owned by defendants. 
There are two decided cases in which the purchase of 
interests in real property in reliance on an oral promise has 
been held to constitute acts of reliance within the meaning of 
Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 Pac. 687, and the celebrated 
and frequently cited case of Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 
578, 25 L. Ed. 618. 
The Vogel case stands for the proposition that where a 
promisor represents to a prom1see that if the promisee will 
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purchase realty of which the promisor is the leasee, the promi-
sor will assign to the promisee his lease and a sublease and 
the promisee buys the property relying upon such representation, 
the promisor is estopped in equity to assert the statute of frauds 
as a defense where an action is brought involving the right 
to the rent paid by the sub-lessee. 
The Wyoming Court held explicitly in this case that a 
plaintiff was enttiled to rely upon the oral agreement to convey 
the lease after he had acted on a promise in good faith, not-
withstanding the fact that the lease was clearly within the 
statute of frauds in the state of Wyoming. This Wyoming case 
is extremely carefully considered; it contains analyses of cases 
from Massachusetts, California, the United States Supreme 
Court, North Carolina, Iowa, Texas, New York and other 
states, and in addition cites a number of well-considered texts 
and authorities. The Wyoming Court concluded "over and 
over again the courts have said that they will not allow the 
defense of the statute of frauds when in so doing it becomes 
an instrument for perpetrating fraud. Vogel having used the 
promise of an intended abandonment of his rights under the 
Files lease to induce Shaw to do what he otherwise would 
not have done, should not-in the language of the court of 
last resort in this nation-'subject such person to loss or injury 
by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.' In 
our judgment the offered proof should have been received 
and error was committed by the trial court in not doing so.'' 
The Dickerson v. Colgrove case, supra, is summarized by 
the Wyoming Court as follows: 
"There one C owned certain land and died, leaving 
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as his only heirs a son and a daughter. On May 3, 
1953, the daughter and her husband conveyed all the 
land to M by warranty deed. M took possession of the 
property. Prior to April 1, 1856, M learned of the 
existence of C' s son and that he lived in California. 
M caused a letter to be written to the son, inquiring 
whether he made any claim to the premises. The son 
wrote to his sister in Michigan wherein he said, 'You 
can tell Mr. Moreton for me, he needs not fear any-
thing from me * * * I intended to give you and yours 
all my property there and more if you need it.' The 
contents of this letter came to the knowledge of M, 
who took no measures to perfect his title nor to pro-
cure redress from the daughter and her husband, who 
had conveyed and paid for the whole of the property, 
nothwithstanding they owned but half. Thereafter M 
conveyed to the defendants, who were numerous and 
who also went into possession of the premises so trans-
ferred. Subsequently the son in California, by quit-
claim deed, passed an undivided one-half of the prop-
erty to the plaintiffs, who brought a suit in ejectment 
against M and his grantees for the land covered by 
the quitclaim deed. The trial court held that the son's 
grantees were bound by an estoppel in pais and gave 
judgment against them. Affirming this judgment and 
citing with approval the language of Judge Kendall 
in the case of Paxton v. Paxton, the Supreme Court of 
the United States significartdy said: 'The estoppel here 
relied upon is known as equitable estoppel or an 
estoppel in pais. The law upon the subject is well 
settled. The vital principle is that he who by his langu-
age or conduct leads another to do what he would not 
otherwise have done shall not subject such person to 
loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon 
which he acted.' " 
The Court further said in the Dickerson-Colg1'ove case 
that a change of position by a promisor under the circumstances 
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there "is sternly forbidden. It involves fraud and falsehood, 
and the law abhors both. This remedy is always so applied as 
to promote the ends of justice." 
A considerable arriount of argument in Appellants' brief 
is devoted to the idea that defendants below can avoid the 
doctrine of equitable conversion by their last minute tender to 
plaintiff of the amount of the purchase price of the Terry 
strip. The record shows that the answer was :filed in this action 
on February 9, 1951. It was in effect a general denial. The 
defendants particularly denied that they had any information 
"pertaining to the acquisition by plaintiff of a strip of land 
purportedly purchased by him as in said paragraph alleged, 
and upon this ground deny the same." This despite the fact 
that Harry Price discussed the Terry sale with Mrs. Terry late 
in 1950 (R. 37). On the 22nd day of May, after the case was 
placed on the trial calendar, defendants came in and made· an 
offer to pay plaintiff the amount of the purchase price for 
this strip of land. 
The entire doctrine of equitable conversion is founded on 
the premise that land itself has a peculiar value, and that the 
payment of a sum of money would not make whole a prom-
issee who has bargained for land. The very fact in this case 
that defendants are now willing to pay some money and that 
plaintiff is unwiling to accept, is indicative of the fact that 
defendants' property on Fifth South has a value far in excess 
of the money expended for the Terry strip. 
Look at the first answer of defendants. Look at the posi-
tion they have taken in this lawsuit. Consider the fact that the 
court below found time after time that the facts were con-
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trary to their testimony. Consider the fact that they refused 
to do anything until they found themselves backed into a 
corner by this lawsuit. The recital demonstrates the fraud 
which would be perpetrated upon Ravarino if defendants were 
permitted to wiggle out of the position in which they have 
placed themselves. 
The unfair position assumed in making the offer is fur-
ther illustrated by an analysis of it. Do they offer to do equity 
when they omit the real estate commissions and taxes paid; 
loss of the opportunity for valuable land and trackage near 
Growers' Market; loss of the use of $19,000.00 for a period 
of several months pending this lawsuit; loss of money in 
bringing a lawsuit to enforce the contract? 
Attention is invited to the similarity of the instant case 
and the case of Boelter v. Blake, 12 N. W. (2d) 327. Here 
a man and wife held title to a home. A written option for 
the purchase of the home by plaintiff was signed by the man 
but not the wife. The wife had knowledge of the option. In 
decreeing specific performance against the wife, the Court 
said: 
"The plaintiffs were tenants living in another dwell-
ing owned by the defendants. After some preliminary 
negotiations, Mr. and Mrs. Boelter inspected the 
Cherrylawn Avenue property, and the terms of its sale 
were agreed upon with Mr. Blake. It was orally agreed 
that at the end of one year the plaintiffs would pur-
chase the Cherrylawn Avenue place for $3,,500, and 
during the year would pay $40 per month, $30 of which 
amount would be considered rent and $10 of which 
($120 at the end of the year) would be applied on the 
down payment. Plaintiffs were also obliged by the 
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agreement to pay $300 as the balance of the down 
payment to the defendants at the end of the year if 
the option to purchase was exercised. The balance of 
the $3,500 was to be paid at the rate of $30 per month, 
which payments included taxes and insurance. On Oc-
tober 4, 1940, the plaintiffs paid to ~fr. Blake $10 
to close the deal and received a receipt therefor which 
Mr. Blake testified should read '$10.00 and $30.00 
when house is ready. Option for rent at 19434 Cherry-
lawn'. It is denied that Mrs. Blake took part in this 
oral agreement although Mrs. Boelter testified that 
Mrs. Blake was present and took part in the conver-
sation. 
* * * * 
"The plaintiffs have fully performed their part of 
the bargain. Mr. Blake signed the option. However, 
Mrs. Blake, as one of the owners of the entireties, did 
not sign the option and normally this failure on her part 
would be a fatal defect in the option, bringing it under 
the Statute of Frauds. Com. Laws 1929, Sec. 13413 
(Stat. Ann. Sec. 26.908). It is a well-recognized 
rule that part performance of a contract may take 
it out of the statute. See Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 13415 
(Stat. Ann. Sec. 26.910). The sole question here is 
as to whether or not there has been such part perform-
ance as to permit a decree of specific performance 
against her. We approve the decision of the trial 
judge that there was such part performance. 
* * * * 
"Mrs. Blake had signed receipts for '$30.00 and 
$10.00' as previously indicated. Obviously she knew all 
the facts concerning the written option and by her 
silence acquiesced in its being given without her signa-
ture. She knew of and made no objection to the repairs 
and alterations made by the plaintiffs in their belief 
that they were going to purchase the property. Mrs. 
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Blake did not timely indicate to the plaintiffs her in-
tention to consider the option void. She knew of and 
acquiesced in the plan of monthly payments made for 
the year, knowing that she and Mr. Blake owned the 
property by the entireties. 
"Careful consideration of this record as a whole 
brings the conclusion that the equities are. all in favor 
of plaintiffs, and that the contract was performed by the 
plaintiffs with the knowledge of the defendants to the 
extent equity requires plaintiffs be decreed specific 
performance. In this jurisdiction there are many de-
cisions to the effect that although oral agreements to 
convey land are void under the statute of frauds above 
cited, Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 13413 (Stat. Ann. Sec. 
26.908), yet under the related section of the statute, 
Comp. Laws, 1929, Sec. 13415 (Stat. Ann. Sec. 26.910), 
a court of equity has the power to grant specific per-
formance of agreements of which there has been part 
performance; and such relief should be granted when 
as between the parties an equitable result will thereby 
be accomplished." 
It is fruitless to speculate in this action as to the amount 
of money required "to make plaintiff whole." The very fact 
that defendants are willing to pay a sum of money instead 
of being bound by the contract indicates that they are aware 
that the land has a value which is not compensable by the 
sum of money they have offered. Moreover, when the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel applies, the promisee acquires a property 
right. The equity passes in the same way as though the 
promisor had signed a written instrument. 
In the language of Lord Chancellor Selborne in Maddison 
v. Alderson, L.R. 8 App. Cas. 467: 
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"In a suit founded on such performance, the defend-
ant is really 'charged' upon the equities resulted from 
the acts done in execution of the contract, and· not 
(within the meaning of the statute) upon the contract 
itself. If such equities were excluded, injustice of a 
kind which the statute cannot be thought to have had in 
contemplation would follow. * * * The matter has 
advanced beyond the stage of contract; and the equi-
ties which arise out of the stage which it has reached 
cannot be administered unless the contract is re-
garded. * * *" 
As stated by the Court in Knauf & T. Co. v. Elkhart Lake 
Sand & Gravel Co., 153· Wis. 306, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 744, 141 
N. W. 701: 
"The Statute of Frauds was not designed to enable 
the evil-disposed to possess an instrumentality with 
which to perpetrate fraud. It is the weapon of the 
written law to prevent fraud, while the doctrine of 
estoppel is that of the unwritten law to prevent like 
evil. Each is effective in its appropriate field. Both 
·are essential to prevent and redress wrongs." 
The obtaining of valuable trackage is, of course, a valu-
able improvement upon real property, but this case does not 
rest alone upon the doctrine of improvement within the mean-
ing of the doctrine of part performance. As the annotator of 
75 A.L.R. points out at Page 653: 
"Such cases, and many others, such as the Vogel 
case, are governed by the broader principles of estoppel, 
rather than by the specific application thereof known 
as the doctrine of part performance." 
We submit that the principles applicable to this case are 
modeled upon the fundamental theories of equity jurispru-
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dence. They are bottomed upon the approach to the law which 
has always. been the particula~ pride of the chancellor. They 
are founded upon the efforts of equity courts to prevent im-
position upon persons as a result of the stern and sometimes 
unyielding rules on the law side of the court. 
It is submitted that the Trial Court in this case correctly 
conceived the legal problem and correctly applied the law. 
Harry Price is estopped to deny his affirmance and acceptance 
of the obligations and terms of Exhibit E. He is bound in 
equity to those terms to the same degree as though he affixed 
his name to the contract. 
·CONCLUSION 
The fundamental problem here is whether the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is applicable to the facts as they were deter-
mined by the Trial Court. The principle was expressly adopted 
by this Court in Bamberger Company v. Certified Productions, 
Inc., et al., 88 Ut. 194, 48 Pac. (2d) 489, that in the language 
of Mr. Justice Cardozo: 
"We are facing a principle more nearly ultimate 
than either waiver or estoppel, one with roots in the yet 
larger principle that no one shall be permitted to found 
any claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of 
his own wrong. * * * The statute of frauds was not 
intended to offer an asylum of escape from that funda-
mental principle of justice." 
In short, the respondent asks this Court to reaffirm the 
principle "that he who by his language or conduct leads 
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another to· do what he would not otherwise have done shall 
not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the 
expectations upon which he acted." Dickerson v. Colgrove, 
100 U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 618. 
All of the argument in the brief submitted by appellants 
and defendants is based upon facts as these defendants and 
appellants would like to have had them determined by the 
Trial Court instead of the factual determination as they were 
made in the Findings of Fact. And yet not one single Finding 
of Fact is directly controverted or contested in this proceeding. 
There is absolutely no reason why the signatures of the two 
women are not binding upon them, and why plaintiff should 
not have specific performance of the contract as to their 
interest in the land. The complaint in this case prayed for such 
performance against all three defendants, resting the liability 
of the defendant Harry Price squarely on the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel. 
It is submitted that the Trial Court correctly conceived 
the law and made correct and adequate Findings of Fact ·in 
this case. Its decree should be affirmed. Moreover, the contract 
provided for reasonable attorney's fees. It is submitted that 
the affidavit filed with this brief as to the amount of reasonable 
attorney's fee for handling of the case on appeal fairly ap-
prises the Court of the value of respondent's attorneys. An 
attorney's fee to respondent in the sum of $1000.00 . should 
be awarded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN AND RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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